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General Accounting Office High Risk List
• Developed in 1990
• Forcing function for agencies to take corrective action on internal 
control and financial management shortcomings
• Programs with greater vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and 
mismanagement
• Assessed through:
• qualitative (detrimental to health and safety, national security, economic 
growth, etc) 
• quantitative (minimum $1 billion risk)
• agency planned or executed corrective action measures 
Composition of High Risk List
• 60 programs
• 8 are DoD specific**
• 6 additional are national security or defense 
related*
• 7 have contract or acquisition in title*
*Only one program removed from high risk since start of 
program
**Two programs removed from high risk since start of program
Composition of High Risk List
Composition of High Risk List
• DoD Personnel Security Clearance Program (7 years)
• Management of Interagency Contracting (9 years)
• Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and 
Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect 
Homeland Security (13 years)
• DoD Supply Chain Management (29 years)
Composition of High Risk List
• DoD Weapon Systems Acquisition (30 years)
• DoE Contract Management for NASA and EM (30 years)
• NASA Acquisition Management (30 years)
• DoD Contract Management (28 years)
• DoD Business Systems Modernization (25 years)
• DoD Financial Management (25 years)
• DoD Support Infrastructure Management (23 years)
• Ensuring Security of Federal Info Systems and Cyber 
Critical Infrastructure (23 years)
• DOD Approach to Business Transformation (15 years)
• Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and 
Operations (5 years)
• VA Acquisition (1 year)
DoD Average Tenure on HRL: 22.75 Years
Research Question – Circle One
Is DoD a high risk anomaly?
YES NO
Long Standing High-Risk Programs
• DoD Weapon Systems Acquisition (30)
• NASA Acquisition Management (30)
• Medicare Program (30)*+
• Enforcement of Tax Laws (30)*
• DoE’s Contract Management for National Security 
Administration & Office of Environmental Management (30)
• DoD Contract Management (28)*
• DoD Financial Management (25)
• DoD Business Systems Modernization (25)
• Ensuring Security of Federal Information Systems & Cyber 
Critical Infrastructure and Protecting Privacy of PII (23)*
• DoD Support Infrastructure Management (23)*
50% are DoD Programs
4 of 10 are Contract or 
Acquisition
*require legislation
+no evaluation on the whole due to required legislation
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Non-DoD programs 
selected for comparison 
with DoD programs
DoD Weapons Acquisition – 2017 
- DoD lacks comprehensive action 
plan 
- DoD issues annual performance 
reports for some programs
- DoD no longer subscribes to 
GAO/OMB cost growth metrics 
developed in 2008
- DoD issued policy to enable 
better outcomes and assessing 
acquisition workforce; in past it 
hasn’t converted into practice
- DoD not implementing all best 
practices across all programs 
- Continue to lack competition for 
product development 
- Acquisition workforce still lacking 
what it needs to resolve risk 
- DoD reduced costs by removing 
programs, not reforming ongoing 
ones; overall cost-growth improved
- Larger programs cost growth 
increased
NASA Acquisition Management – 2017 
- reports metrics on semiannual 
basis, performs within 
parameters outlined in plan
- Established own metrics to 
monitor progress; metrics reflect 
improved performance
- guidance and implementation tools 
to reduce risk not always consistent 
with best practices for cost 
schedule estimates 
- continued issues on costliest 
projects 
- Resource constraints to implement 
GAO recommendations
- difficulty managing most expensive 
and complex projects
- 3 costliest programs have unreliable 
cost estimates, ambitious deadlines, 
limited reserves, and extended 
operating periods
- limited visibility into long-term costs
- inconsistency with measuring 
progress in reducing acquisition risks 
Acquisition
DoD NASA
- Cost increases, schedule 
delays, development problems
- Unrealistic planning due to higher 
anticipated budget
- More detailed, program specific 
report
- Programs tightly interconnected
- Small organization
- GAO displayed understanding of 
NASA organization and 
functioning
- Able to develop own monitoring 
criteria
- Lacked significant management 
and structure early on
- Technical and large programs have 
continued risk
- Largest federal acquisition 
program
- Recommends changes that 
would require changes to DoD 
organizational policies
- Monitoring criteria a combined 
effort with GAO and OMB, DoD 
no longer subscribes
- No recorded impact of 
leadership commitment
DoD Contract Management – 2017 
(Acquisition Workforce, Service Acquisition, and Operational Contract Support)
- Lacks ensuring right people for 
right career field
- Lacks plan to prepare annual 
inventory of contracted services 
to inform workforce and budget 
decisions
- No service acquisition action plan
- Needs metrics to track progress 
for workforce plan strategy
- Acquisition lacks spending 
monitoring or savings goals
- Need career field growth
- Skills gap in workforce not yet 
addressed
- Lack verification that current 
composition will meet future needs
- Limited guidance on collecting 
acquisition information
- Lack implementation of some OCS 
recommendations
DoE Contract Management – 2017 
Secretary memo not comprehensive by 
failing to address:
(1) Major contract acquisition planning
(2) the quality of enterprise-wide cost 
information available to DOE managers 
and key stakeholders
(3) DOE’s need for a program 
management policy
(4) how DOE’s new requirements will be 
applied to the department’s major 
legacy projects
- recent improvements not assessed 
yet for sustainability of corrective 
measures 
- not comprehensive 
- depends on availability of reliable 
enterprise-wide cost information
- Lack people and resources
- lacking in cost and schedule 
performance evaluation and 
oversight of major projects and 
programs
- Lack training to implement 
governance model 
- recent reforms require time to 
evaluate
- struggle with cost and schedule 
estimates for major projects, and 
project management




- Non-competitive contracts 
awarded to subcontractors
- Too little, too late oversight on 
contractors; little to none on 
subcontractors
- Able to narrow down to 
two specific, large 
programs
- Senior leadership 
committed to changing 
culture
- Less resources, may 
require additional 
legislation to address
- Contract overpricing and 
overpayment
- Multiple branches often 
delays implementation
- Robust workforce, made 
significant progress in 
manning
- Did not track acquisition 
spending and no targets 
for savings
- Largest contracting budgets 
- Difficulty in future projections
High Risk Trends
• The more technical the program, the greater the risk
• Association with defense and national security lends 
to greater risk
• The larger the program, the greater the risk
High Risk Trends
Is DoD a high risk anomaly?
NO
Common issues across risk areas no matter 
size of program or relation to defense
YES
DoD is always defense related and will 
continue to be large
GAO should modify approach
• Given GAO recommended changes to weapon 
acquisition, they should consider recommending 
legislation
• Pending legislation, GAO should assess weapon 
acquisition at individual program level to see 
immediate impact
• GAO should push for overall government contract 
reform, change how the government handles all 
contracts to change the contracting culture
Phase 2
Phase two of this research will include interviews from 
within DoD, GAO, and other organizations evaluated to 
assess whether recommendations are viable. 
Questions
